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THE PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTEREST IN
INVENTORY VERSUS THE AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY
INTEREST-A "NO WIN" SITUATION
Nathaniel Hansford*
Ford Credit has relied on its belief that it had and has a valid
purchase money security interest in the collateral financed by it
utilizing documents containing an after-acquired property clause
and future advance clauses in making its wholesale loans ....
As of 12/31/84, Ford Credit had in excess of $5.3 Billion in out-
standing obligations on which it extended credit believing that it
had a valid purchase money security interest ....
Assuming that some method can be devised whereby Ford Credit
would be able to maintain its purchase money security position
while utilizing future advance and after-acquired property clauses
in its documentation, it would then be necessary for Ford Credit to
attempt to re-document its existing financing agreements with over
3500 dealers located throughout the United States. The cost of
such a re-documentation process would be substantial.'
* Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law; B.S., 1965, University of Geor-
gia; LL.B., 1968, University of Georgia; LL.M., 1980, University of Michigan.
The author thanks Mr. Thomas R. Elliott of London, Yancy & Clark, Birmingham, and
Mr. Laurence D. Vinson, Jr. of Bradley, Arant, Rose & White, Birmingham, for allowing
him full access to their files on the Southtrust Bank v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. case.
1. Affidavit of George V. Burbach, Associate Counsel, Ford Motor Credit Company,
Southtrust Bank v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 760 F.2d 1240, reh'g denied mem., 774
F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1985) (Petition for Rehearing by Panel and Suggestion for Rehearing
En Banc).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Extending credit entails risk. Seldom is a creditor absolutely as-
sured of complete payment of his debt. Not only is there a risk in
almost every loan, but the types of risks that must be weighed are
manifold. The debtor may be a poor business person and never
make a profit sufficient to repay the debt. The debtor class is re-
plete with scoundrels and outright crooks who borrow money with-
out any intention to service the debt. The economy may slump to
such a degree that even astute business persons are pressed to pay
their outstanding obligations. The creditor's collateral may deterio-
rate or vanish, and even if the collateral is preserved, another cred-
itor may have first claim on the debtor's property.
A creditor prices the loan with an appropriate interest rate to
offset these risks insomuch as he is able to assess them at the time
he extends credit. Also, the creditor will often demand that the
debtor grant him a security interest in the debtor's property that
has value in excess of the loan. The law of debtor-creditor relations
has evolved in such a manner as to help reduce loan risks, so that
both the creditor and the debtor have benefited from this evolu-
tion. The creditor enjoys greater likelihood of debt satisfaction,
and the debtor is able to obtain easier credit at lower interest
rates.
Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) 2 is the
most modern statement of the law with respect to the securing of
loans with the debtor's personal property. The U.C.C. has at-
tempted to develop, and in most instances has succeeded in devel-
oping, an orderly and certain system of creditor and debtor protec-
tion.3 Article Nine simplifies the traditional procedure by which a
creditor obtains a security interest in the debtor's personal prop-
erty and thus helps ensure that the creditor has valuable collateral
to support the outstanding debt. The drafters of the U.C.C., how-
ever, were not completely successful in achieving the goals of order
and simplicity in commercial lending.
This article will assess one of the many risks that a creditor may
confront when he extends credit. The risk is one that the drafters
of the U.C.C. created in implementing two of their most innovative
2. U.C.C. § 9 (1978).
3. A discussion of the inadequacy of pre-U.C.C. security devices is presented in 1A P.
COOGAN, W. HOGAN, D. VAGTS & J. McDONNELL, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 7.01[4] (1985) [hereinafter cited as SECURED TRANSACTIONS].
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concepts-the after-acquired property clause and the purchase
money provisions.4 Generally stated, the risk that a secured credi-
tor faces related to these concepts is whether he may lose his prior-
ity in the debtor's property to another creditor. The more narrow
issue that this article addresses is the conflict between the secured
creditor, relying on an after-acquired property clause in inventory,
and a purchase money secured party.
The rule that the purchase money secured party has priority
over an earlier perfected secured party is elementary. Many au-
thors have written on this principle over the last three decades
since the U.C.C. announced it.5 The point of this article is not to
weigh the rule's value or to discuss its general application. Rather,
this article will analyze the operation and scope of the rule in the
limited case of inventory financing, and in light of the policy rea-
son underlying it.7 Furthermore, the article proposes (1) that a se-
cured party relying on an after-acquired property clause cannot as-
sure future creditors of first priority in any of the debtor's after-
acquired inventory once a purchase money secured party comes
into existence, and (2) that a purchase money security interest in
inventory is of little, if any, value to a creditor. The purchase
money interest muddies the water without aiding the purchase
money party or the debtor to a great degree. The cases which deal
with purchase money lending accompanied by security agreements
containing a debt add-on clause, a cross-collateral clause, a future
advance clause, or an after-acquired property clause, support these
propositions.
4. U.C.C. §§ 9-204, 9-107 (1978).
5. See, e.g., Baker, Priority Conflicts Involving Purchase-Money Security Interests,
PRAC. LAWS., Oct. 1983, at 67; McLaughlin, Qualifying as a Third-Party Purchase-Money
Financier: The Hurdles to Be Cleared, the Advantages to Be Gained, 13 U.C.C. L.J. 225
(1981); Note, The Priority Conflict Between A Purchase Money Security Interest and a
Prior Security Interest In Future Accounts Receivable, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1157 (1969).
6. For a discussion of the rule's application in determining priority among creditors, see
Baker, Priority Conflicts Involving Purchase Money Security Interests, 29 PRAC. LAW. Oct.
1983, at 67.
7. A very interesting article that relies on economic analysis in explaining the reason for
the purchase money exception and its limitations is Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financ-
ing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979).
1986]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:235
II. PRIORITY SCHEME OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
A. General Rule
Section 9-312 establishes the priority scheme of the U.C.C.s Sub-
section 9-312(5) is the general conflict rule and states the method
for determining priority between conflicting security interests in
situations not covered in the prior subsections.9 The basic priority
rule of Article Nine is the "first-in-time, first-in-right" rule. The
measuring point for the first-in-time, first-in-right rule is either the
filing of a financing statement or the perfection of the security in-
terest. The first secured party to perfect his security interest or file
a financing statement has superior rights in the collateral. The
drafters of the U.C.C. selected this race-type rule for its simplicity
and certainty. The rule is easy to apply, and it preserves the filing
system. A rule that creates certainty is comprehendible, enhances
commercial activity, reduces the cost of doing business, and helps
the debtor obtain credit.10
B. Purchase Money Security Interest
However, the U.C.C. does recognize one type of security interest
that is exempt from the first-in-time, first-in-right rule, and it
gives this interest a priority over an earlier perfected Article Nine
security interest." The type of security interest that the U.C.C.
8. U.C.C. § 9-312 (1978) states rules for establishing priority among creditors. This section
specifically addresses security interests in crops, inventory, and other collateral, and also
states a general rule for determining priority between those types of conflicting security
interests not specifically addressed.
9. U.C.C. § 9-312<5) (1978) states as follows:
In all cases not governed by other rules stated in this section (including cases of
purchase money security interests which do not qualify for the special priorities set
forth in subsections (3) and (4) of this section), priority between conflicting security
interests in the same collateral shall be determined according to the following rules:
(a) Conflicting security interests rank according to priority in time of filing or
perfection. Priority dates from the time a filing is first made covering the collateral
or the time the security interest is first perfected, whichever is earlier, provided
that there is no period thereafter when there is neither filing nor perfection.
(b) So long as conflicting security interests are unperfected, the first to attach has
priority.
Id.
10. Id. § 9-312 comment 4.
11. The specific language is as follows:
(3) A perfected purchase money security interest in inventory has priority over a
conflicting security interest in the same inventory and also has priority in identifiable
cash proceeds received on or before the delivery of the inventory to a buyer if
(a) the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time the debtor re-
238
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singles out for special priority and other special treatment is the
purchase money security interest.12 A purchase money security in-
terest is defined in U.C.C. section 9o107.13 The principal feature of
a purchase money security interest is that the debtor uses the
money borrowed, i.e. the debt, to purchase the property that serves
as the collateral for the security interest.14 A security interest is a
ceives possession of the inventory; and
(b) the purchase money secured party gives notification in writing to the holder
of the conflicting security interest if the holder had filed a financing statement cov-
ering the same types of inventory (i) before the date of the filing made by the
purchase money secured party, or (ii) before the beginning of the 21 day period
where the purchase money security interest is temporarily perfected without filing
or possession (subsection (5) of Section 9-304); and
(c) the holder of the conflicting security interest receives the notification within
five years before the debtor receives possession of the inventory; and
(d) the notification states that the person giving the notice has or expects to
acquire a purchase money security interest in inventory of the debtor, describing
such inventory by item or type.
(4) A purchase money security interest in collateral other than inventory has prior-
ity over a conflicting security interest in the same collateral or its proceeds if the
purchase money security interest is perfected at the time the debtor receives posses-
sion of the collateral or within ten days thereafter.
Id. § 9-312(3), (4) (1972).
12. U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d) (1978) establishes a special perfection rule for purchase money
security interests in consumer goods:
A financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests except . . . a
purchase money security interest in consumer goods; but filing is required for a motor
vehicle required to be registered; and fixture filing is required for priority over con-
flicting interests in fixtures to the extent provided in Section 9-313.
Id.
U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (1978) establishes a priority rule in a conflict between a purchase money
security interest and a lien creditor:
If the secured party files with respect to a purchase money security interest before or
within ten days after the debtor receives possession of the collateral, he takes priority
over the rights of. . . a lien creditor which arise between the time the security inter-
est attaches and the time of filing.
Id.
13. U.C.C. § 9-107 (1978) states as follows:
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the extent that it is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price;
or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives
value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such value is
in fact so used.
Id.
14. Under pre-U.C.C. law, a purchase money security interest was granted special prior-
ity. 2 G. GILMORE, SEcuRITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 28-2 (1965). Accordingly,
the author noted:
As to business inventory, the purchase-money security interest was achieved through
the trust receipt and a non-purchase-money security interest, through the so-called
factor's lien. The U.C.C.'s purchase-money security interest in consumer goods is, of
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purchase money security interest to the extent that the debtor uses
the loan proceeds to purchase the collateral.
The U.C.C. recognizes two types of purchase money security in-
terests. The first, and perhaps most common, occurs in the case
where the vendor sells goods to a customer on time and retains a
security interest in the goods. The customer has actually borrowed
the money from the seller and is thus a debtor of the seller. One of
the seller's motivations in agreeing to the loan is that he retains an
Article Nine security interest in the goods.
The second type of purchase money security interest arises when
the creditor makes the loan to the debtor with the express under-
standing that the debtor will use the proceeds to purchase certain
property, and the property is in fact purchased. This form of
purchase money security interest usually follows three steps: (1)
the creditor obtains a security agreement from the debtor covering
the collateral to be purchased; (2) the creditor advances money to
the debtor; and (3) the debtor purchases the collateral with the
money advanced.
C. Reasons for the Purchase Money Exceptions
Subsections 9-312(3) and (4) make special priority provisions for
a purchase money secured party and allow his interest to defeat an
earlier perfected security interest. In these two instances, the
U.C.C. sanctions exceptions to the general first-in-time, first-in-
right rule. The traditional reasons for granting these exceptions are
both debtor- and creditor-oriented. 15 First, the debtor may need
protection from a prior creditor who has a security interest with an
after-acquired property clause. This after-acquired property clause
acts as a shadow over all of the debtor's business. If the secured
party is unwilling to extend further credit, the debtor would nor-
mally find other lenders reluctant to advance funds if they were to
receive only a subordinate interest. Because the purchase money
exception exists, the prior creditor cannot tie up the debtor's prop-
erty in this fashion, thereby forcing the debtor to deal with him on
his own terms. The debtor may buy inventory or equipment from
course, merely a new name for the conditional sale of the same kind of collateral; the
purchase-money security interest in inventory is, among other things, a continuation
of the trust receipt . ...
1A SECURED TRANSACTIONS, supra note 3, § 7.01[6] (footnote omitted).
15. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 25-5 (2d ed. 1980).
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the seller on credit, and the seller will have first claim to the prop-
erty as a purchase money secured party."6
The second reason offered for the exception to the first-in-time,
first-in-right rule is the policy that a seller of property should not
be forced to check the filing system with respect to property he has
sold the debtor. The law should never force a seller of property to
lose priority in property he has sold to the debtor on credit.,'
D. After-Acquired Property Clauses
It is the after-acquired property clause that creates the necessity
for the purchase money exception. U.C.C. section 9-2041 provides
that a creditor may take a security interest in the existing property
of the debtor and property that the debtor may acquire after he
grants a security interest to the creditor. Therefore, when the
debtor buys property, the perfected security interest of the earlier
creditor attaches to the new property under the after-acquired
property clause. The purchase money exception allows a seller of
property in a credit purchase to take a security interest that is su-
perior to this earlier after-acquired property security interest. 9
E. Purchase Money Interest in Inventory and Other Collateral
The U.C.C. establishes one priority rule for purchase money in-
terests in inventory and another rule for purchase money priority
in all other types of collateral. Subsection 9-312(4),2o which deals
with collateral other than inventory, is the simpler of the two sets
of purchase money rules with which to comply. If the creditor per-
16. Id. at 1043.
17. Id.
18. U.C.C. § 9-204 (1978) states as follows:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a security agreement may provide that
any or all obligations covered by the security agreement are to be secured by after-
acquired collateral.
(2) No security interest attaches under an after-acquired property clause to con-
sumer goods other than accessions (Section 9-314) when given as additional security
unless the debtor acquires rights in them within ten days after the secured party
gives value.
(3) Obligations covered by a security agreement may include future advances or
other value whether or not the advances or value are given pursuant to commitment
(subsection (1) of Section 9-105).
Id.
19. Id. § 9-312 comment 6, example 4 (1978).
20. The text of U.C.C. § 9-312(4) (1978) is set out supra note 11.
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fects his purchase money security interest within ten days after the
debtor receives possession of the collateral, the security interest is
superior to any earlier after-acquired property liens. The collateral
covered by subsection 9-312(4) will be equipment in almost all in-
stances. Consumer goods are subject to a very limited form of af-
ter-acquired property interest,21 and practically, accounts are not
the type of collateral that fit within section 9-107's definition of a
purchase money security interest.
Subsection 9-312(3)22 establishes a special purchase money ex-
ception for inventory that differs from the subsection (4) excep-
tion. The primary differences are the perfection time frame and
the notice requirement. In order to qualify for this purchase money
exception, the secured party must have perfected his interest by
the time the debtor receives possession of the inventory. Subsec-
tion (3) does not grant the ten-day unperfected grace period which
subsection (4) allows. Moreover, the purchase money secured party
must give notice of his security interest to any holder of a conflict-
ing security interest.23
Comment three to section 9-312 explains the reason for the no-
tice requirement in the inventory situation. Inventory financing
often involves a secured party who has agreed to make future ad-
vances based upon his after-acquired property clause covering fu-
ture collateral of the debtor. Notice by a purchase money financier
of his interest in collateral makes the earlier secured party aware
that he should not rely on newly purchased collateral to support
any future advances. In fact, the comment presumes that the ear-
lier secured party will not make any extensions of credit after this
notice from a purchase money party. 4
III. MODEL COMMERCIAL CASE
Southtrust Bank v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp.25 is a proto-
typical case of the conflict between a secured party relying upon an
after-acquired property clause and a purchase money secured
21. "N o security interest attaches under an after-acquired property clause to consumer
goods other than accessions (Section 9-314) when given as additional security unless the
debtor acquires rights in them within ten days after the secured party gives value." Id. § 9-
204(2).
22. The text of U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1978) is set out supra note 11.
23. See id. § 9-312(3).
24. Id. § 9-312 comment 3.
25. 760 F.2d 1240, reh'g denied mem., 774 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1985).
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party who asserts priority under subsection 9-312(3). The case is a
useful vehicle to demonstrate the risks confronting both of these
parties.
The debtors in Southtrust Bank were a group of appliance
stores in Alabama and Georgia. The creditors were Southtrust
Bank and Borg-Warner Acceptance Corporation. Both creditors
obtained a valid security interest in the inventory of the debtors'
appliance stores. Both Southtrust and Borg-Warner filed financing
statements, which identified the collateral, with the proper state
officials in Alabama and Georgia in order to perfect their respec-
tive security interests. In each instance, Southtrust was first to file
and obtained a perfected security interest in the existing inventory
of the debtors and their after-acquired inventory. Borg-Warner ad-
vanced money over a period of time to the debtors, and the debt-
ors used these funds to acquire inventory. Borg-Warner retained a
security interest in the property the debtors purchased. Borg-
Warner understood that its security agreement with the debtors
created a purchase money interest, and it intended to claim a
purchase money priority. Accordingly, the company complied with
subsection 9-312(3) by sending notice to Southtrust and perfecting
before the debtors received the inventory.26
Borg-Warner's security agreement contained the following
provision:
In order to secure repayment to Secured Party of all such extensions
of credit made by Secured Party in accordance with this Agreement,
and to secure payment of all other debts or liabilities and perform-
ance of all obligations of Debtor to Secured Party, whether now ex-
isting or hereafter arising, Debtor agrees that Secured Party shall
have and hereby grants to Secured Party a security interest in all
Inventory of Debtor, whether now owned or hereafter acquired, and
all Proceeds and products thereof 27
Thus, according to the terms of the security agreement, Borg-
Warner claimed property purchased with the proceeds of its loan,
as well as the existing property of the debtor and later-acquired
26. Southtrust Bank contended that notice of Borg-Warner's interest was never received
and this issue was argued in the United States District Court. See Southtrust Bank v. Borg-
Warner Acceptance Corp., No. 83-G-0951-5 (N.D. Ala. 1984). A secured party's failure to
follow the notice rule of § 9-312(3), and his resultant failure to come within the exception, is
not the lending risk this article studies.
27. Southtrust Bank, 760 F.2d at 1241-42.
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property of the debtor, as collateral for the loan. The security in-
terest attempted both to claim purchase money status and to at-
tach to the after-acquired property as it came into the debtor's
possession.
On each occasion that a debtor purchased an appliance, the out-
standing debt on that item was secured by the item itself and by
all other existing inventory of the debtor. Of course, Borg-Warner
had in fact financed the purchase of this other inventory and be-
lieved it was justified in seeking the extra security. This arrange-
ment, however, operated as a typical cross-collateral clause. More-
over, whenever any item of inventory was sold and the
corresponding loan had not yet been paid, Borg-Warner considered
itself to still be secured by the other items of inventory which the
debtor had not sold, but for which the debtor had paid all or some
part of the corresponding loan. This procedure, coupled with the
after-acquired property clause, operated as a debt add-on clause.
Borg-Warner provided no mechanism in its agreements with the
debtors, and employed no mechanism in practice, to allocate the
debtors' payments first to the unpaid loans on the particular item
that gave rise to the debt and then to other unpaid indebtedness of
the debtors. When a debtor sold items of inventory, there was no
requirement that the unpaid balance of the loan referable to that
item be paid off with the proceeds of the sale.2 8
An inventory financier's inclusion of an after-acquired property
clause in a security agreement for which it intends to seek
purchase money priority is not unusual. The affidavits of officials
of two major inventory lenders, which were presented on a petition
for rehearing in the Southtrust Bank case, acknowledge that this
practice is their normal procedure.2 9 Both BancAmerica Pri-
vateBrands, Inc. and Ford Motor Credit Company, which have
combined outstanding obligations of approximately six billion dol-
lars with over 16,000 dealers, incorporate an after-acquired prop-
erty clause in their security agreements. These companies often
rely upon their purchase money status to achieve priority over ear-
28. Occasionally Borg-Warner refinanced the debt in such a manner as to add on debt to
collateral that was already in the appliance store's possession. Deposition of Jere Jackson at
55, 57, 64, 66, Southtrust Bank, No. 82-G-051-5.
29. Affidavits of George V. Burbach, Associate Counsel of Ford Motor Credit Company,
and Richard W. Moyer, Vice President and Associate General Counsel of BancAmerica Pri-
vateBrands, Inc. f/k/a FinanceAmerica PrivateBrands, Inc., Southtrust Bank, 774 F.2d 1179
(11th Cir. 1985) (petition for rehearing by panel and suggestion for rehearing en banc).
[Vol. 20:235
PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTEREST
lier secured parties.30
IV. CONFLICTS BETWEEN AFTER-ACQUIRED INTERESTS AND
PURCHASE MONEY INTERESTS
The questions that arise from consideration of the prototype are:
(1) what effect does the inclusion of an after-acquired property
clause have on the secured party's purchase money status, and
thus on its superiority over earlier secured parties?; (2) of what
real value is a purchase money security interest without an after-
acquired property clause?; and (3) to what extent can a secured
party, which perfected its interest in after-acquired property
before a purchase money creditor came into existence, rely upon
any of the debtor's property as collateral?
The courts often have reviewed the special rights that the law
affords a purchase money secured interest. This review has oc-
curred principally in two areas of the law, and in both, the issue
centers on whether the secured party can qualify for purchase
money status. The first area of the law where the issue arises is
under the U.C.C.'s special perfection and priority rules for a
purchase money party.3 1 The second area in which cases have dis-
cussed this problem, and the area in which most of the litigation
has occurred, is bankruptcy law.
32
V. THE SECTION 9-302 PURCHASE MONEY SECURED PARTY
A. The Section 9-302 Cases
The first cases that dealt with the issue of purchase money sta-
tus arose in the bankruptcy courts and centered on subsections 9-
302(1)(c) and (d) of the U.C.C. These subsections provide for auto-
matic perfection of purchase money security interests in consumer
goods, and formerly provided for automatic perfection in farm
equipment with a purchase price not in excess of $2,500.33 This
30. Affidavits of George V. Burbach, Associate Counsel of Ford Motor Credit Company,
and Richard W. Moyer, Vice President and Associate General Counsel of BancAmerica Pri-
vateBrands, Inc. f/k/a FinanceAmerica PrivateBrands, Inc., Southtrust Bank, 774 F.2d 1179
(11th Cir. 1985) (petition for rehearing by panel and suggestion for rehearing en banc).
31. U.C.C. §§ 9-302(1)(d), 9-312 (1978); se& infra notes 33-53 and accompanying text.
32. 11 U.S.C. § 522(0 (1982); see infra notes 55-80 and accompanying text.
33. U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (1962) allowed special perfection for both purchase money security
interests in consumer goods and in farm equipment with a purchase price over $2,500. The
1972 revision of Article Nine removed the farm equipment provision. The provision for au-
tomatic perfection of security interests in consumer goods is contained in U.C.C. § 9-
1986]
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type of purchase money interest is perfected immediately upon at-
tachment of the security interest, without the necessity of filing a
financing statement. Since the Bankruptcy Code charges trustees
with overseeing the rights of the general creditors of the debtor,34
one of the first points the trustee scrutinizes is the secured party's
mode of perfection. If the trustee can prove that the Article Nine
secured party has not perfected his interest, he can break the claim
of the secured party to the collateral and use it for the benefit of
the general creditors.3 5
The first case to consider this issue was In re Simpson.3 6 In In re
Simpson, the court concluded that a security agreement covering
farm equipment was not a purchase money security interest be-
cause the purchased item secured more indebtedness than just the
purchase price of the farm equipment. The court determined that
a literal reading of the section 9-107 definition of purchase money
secured interest might allow the interest to be purchase money "to
the extent that it is taken or retained by the seller . . . to secure
all or a part of its [purchase] price";37 however, this meaning was
not the result the drafters of the U.C.C. intended. The court stated
its view of the law to be that
[olne of the purposes of the Code is to "simplify, clarify and mod-
ernize the law governing commercial transactions." One of the few
exceptions to the requirement that notice by filing be a prerequisite
to perfection of a security agreement is the purchase money security
interest under certain conditions. If a vendor or lender desires to
take advantage of this non-filing requirement, the burden should be
on him to prepare a simple instrument which shall be a pure
purchase money security agreement without attempting to burden it
with complicated and ambiguous impedimenta. Much of the litiga-
tion which filled our courts under pre-code law was due to the effort
of adroit drafters to determine how far they could go in concocting
instruments that would give maximum rights to vendors and lenders
while still qualifying as conditional sales contracts and thus avoiding
the necessity of filing. It is to be hoped that such antics will not
occur under the Code."
302(1)(d) (1978), the text of which is set out supra note 12.
34. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 323, 541 (1982).
35. See id. § 544(b).
36. 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 243 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
37. Id. at 247.
38. Id. at 248 (citation omitted). In re Simpson involved the § 9-302(1)(c) exception for
low priced farm equipment. Commentators have argued that the § 9-302(1)(c) exception is
[Vol. 20:235
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The commissioners who drafted the subsection 9-302(1)(d) ex-
ception explained their action in comment four to that section: "In
many jurisdictions under prior law security interests in consumer
goods under conditional sale or bailment lease were not subject to
filing requirements. Paragraph 1(d) follows the policy of those ju-
risdictions."39 In order to understand the limits the drafters in-
tended for the purchase money interest in this section, it is thus
necessary to discover the reason for this pre-U.C.C. policy that the
U.C.C. adopts.
A purchase money security interest is a direct descendant of the
pre-U.C.C. conditional sales contract.40 Professor Grant Gilmore,
in his classic treatise on security in personal property, states that
[t]he keystone of modern conditional sales theory came to be that
the device was limited to use in financing sales transactions. It could
not be used in any situation where a loan was to be secured by prop-
erty owned by the borrower at the time the loan was made.
Another aspect of conditional sales theory which reflected the
sales background was the apparently general assumption that the
only obligation which could be secured was the purchase price of the
goods plus expenses connected with, or incidental to, the sale or the
financing transaction.
41
Professor Gilmore further explains the reason for the rule in pre-
U.C.C. law and thus the drafters' motivation in continuing it under
the U.C.C.:
of little value, and not worth the disruption it might cause the filing system, See 1 G. Gi,-
MORE, supra note 14, § 19.3, at 533. The § 9-302(1)(c) exception was eliminated from the
U.C.C. in 1972, for the reason that "[t]he analogy drawn in the 1962 Code of farm equip-
ment to consumer goods (for which a similar nonfiling rule is provided in [9-302(1)(d)])
[was] believed to be inappropriate." U.C.C. § 9-302 comment (1978) (reasons for 1972
change).
The fact that In re Simpson was concerned with a purchase money security interest in
farm equipment rather than consumer goods, and that the court's discussion of purchase
money status is actually dictum, has diminished the reliance other courts have been willing
to place on the decision.
39. U.C.C. § 9-302 comment 4 (1978).
40. A conditional sales contract is "a purchase money security transaction, subject in
most states to statute, in which title to the goods was retained by the seller or his assignee
until the full purchase price had been paid usually in periodic installments." 1 G. GIMORE,
supra note 14, § 3.7, at 81.
41. Id. § 3.3, at 68, 71.
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It is surely not unreasonable to conclude that a filing system in this
area [i.e., purchase money security interest in consumer goods] . . .
is useless; none of the creditors or purchasers for whose benefit the
files are maintained will ever look at them, either because they are
not interested in the information or because. . . they are not capa-
ble of consulting files and not enough money is involved to make
anyone think of hiring a lawyer.42
While subsection 9-302(1)(d) provides for automatic perfection
without filing, the exception to the filing requirement is not with-
out limitations. More specifically, a security agreement purporting
to use collateral to secure debt other than its own price will not
qualify as a purchase money interest entitled to be perfected with-
out filing. The point is illustrated in two cases.
The most widely quoted case with respect to automatic perfec-
tion of a purchase money security interest in consumer goods is In
re Manuel.43 In In re Manuel, the debtor had paid approximately
$150, on a total indebtedness of $900, for seven pieces of furniture
and a television set. The merchant-seller kept no record to identify
those items for which the debtor had paid and those for which the
debtor still owed money. Moreover, the security agreement did not
provide for a method, such as "first bought first paid," to allocate
the payments." The court concluded that a plain reading of U.C.C.
section 9-107 indicated that it required a purchase money security
interest to be in the item purchased and that this type of security
interest could not exceed the price of consumer goods purchased.45
Since the security interest at issue did not qualify for purchase
money status, it was not automatically perfected under U.C.C. sec-
tion 9-302(1)(d). 4 Since the seller had not filed a financing state-
ment, the security interest was unperfected. Beyond this reasoning,
the court basically adopted the ideas expressed in In re Simpson,
and cited it with approval.47
42. Id. § 19.4, at 535.
43. 507 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975).
44. Id. at 993.
45. Id.
46. Id. In the bankruptcy context, courts have adopted a judicial first-in, first-out rule to
save a purchase money security interest. See, e.g., In re Gibson, 16 Bankr. 257 (D. Kan.
1981); see also infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
47. See id. In In re Staley, 426 F. Supp. 437 (M.D. Ga. 1977), the court determined that
In re Manuel did not apply since the security agreement explicitly provided that the secur-
ity interest in items purchased was to terminate as soon as the debtor paid the purchase
price of the item. Id. at 437-38.
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In In re Norrell,48 the court addressed the secured party's argu-
ment that his purchase money status was preserved by the opera-
tion of a state consumer protection statute.49 The statute provided
that payments on revolving accounts were to be applied first to
goods which the debtor first purchased.50 The court concluded that
the statute did not apply to the "creation, duration, definition, or
enforcement of purchase money security interests in consumer
goods, and, specifically, [did] not purport to terminate a security
interest contrary to the clear terms of a security agreement."51 Be-
cause the security agreement at issue provided that, as long as any
indebtedness was outstanding, property stood as collateral not only
for its price but for the price of property subsequently acquired on
credit, the security interest was not a purchase money interest, and
the subsection 9-302(1)(d) exception did not apply.2 The creditor
could not rely on the state statute to tailor the security interest in
such a manner that it became purchase money. 3
B. Policies Underlying the Section 9-302 Decisions
Cases that have addressed the subsection 9-302(1)(d) perfection
without filing exception for purchase money security interests indi-
cate an overriding policy of protecting the filing system. Absent
clear justification to dispense with the filing requirement, the rea-
sons underlying automatic perfection lack weight to render the ex-
ception applicable. Thus, only in the strict case of the well-deline-
ated purchase money security agreement, which ties price to the
purchased collateral, will the filing system be regarded as useless;
only in this situation will the U.C.C. allow perfection without
filing.
48. 426 F. Supp. 435 (M.D. Ga. 1977).
49. The statute involved was Georgia's Retail Installment and Home Solicitation Sales
Act, GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-8 (1981).
50. 426 F. Supp. at 436.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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VII. THE SUBSECTION 522(f)54 PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY
INTEREST
A. The Subsection 522(f) Case
Like the U.C.C., the Bankruptcy Code of 197811 establishes some
special protections in its scheme of debtor and creditor rights.
Under subsection 522(f)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor
may avoid nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security interests in
certain types of exempt property. 56 Thus, just as in the U.C.C. sec-
tion 9-302 situation, the trustee in bankruptcy will carefully scruti-
nize all security interests in the debtor's property that come within
the terms of subsection 522(f) to determine if he can attack them
as nonpurchase money interests. 57 Since the property which is sub-
ject to the security interest is exempt property, most of the bank-
ruptcy cases have involved consumer goods as collateral.5
Since the purchase money secured interest under section 522(f)
is singled out for special treatment, the reason for such treatment
becomes pertinent, as does the question whether courts should de-
fine a purchase money security interest broadly or narrowly in or-
der to achieve the desired result. The cases demonstrate that
courts have gone through a sifting process in establishing the limits
of the purchase money secured interest under section 522(f).59
54. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1982).
55. Id. §§ 1-151326.
56. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1982) provides as follows:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien
on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an ex-
emption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this
section, if such lien is-(1) a judicial lien; or (2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money
security interest in any-(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing ap-
parel, appliances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are held
primarily for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of
the debtor; (B) implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor or
the trade of a dependent of the debtor; or (C) professionally prescribed health aids
for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
Id.
57. The Bankruptcy Code of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-151326 (1982) does not define the term
"purchase money security interest." The Bankruptcy court has defined a § 522(f) purchase
money security interest by reference to U.C.C. § 9-107 (1972). See In re Haus, 18 Bankr. 413
(D. S.C. 1982).
58. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1978) identifies exempt property for bankruptcy purposes. Under
11 U.S.C. § 522(b), exempt property may be either the property identified in § 522(d) or
exempt property as defined by state laws.
59. The following cases have discussed the purchase money status under § 522(f): Pristas
v. Landaus of Plymouth, 742 F.2d 797 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Matthews, 724 F.2d 798 (9th Cir.
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Most of the bankruptcy cases have opted for the view that the
thrust of section 522 is, first, to save the debtor's exempt property
from creditors other than those that have actually sold the debtor
the item, and second, to protect the debtor from the seller's claims
to property other than the property they actually sold.60 In other
words, courts view the goal of subsection 522(f) as being to dis-
courage the seller's greed and to prevent him from tying up the
debtor's property with his security interest.
The legislative history of subsection 522(f) indicates that Con-
gress' intent in creating the section was to protect consumers from
overreaching:
Frequently, creditors lending money to a consumer debtor take a
security interest in all of the debtor's belongings, and obtain a
waiver by the debtor of his exemptions. In most of these cases, the
debtor is unaware of the consequences of the form he signs ....
1984); In re Middleton, 37 Bankr. 36 (D. Minn. 1983); In re Sprague, 29 Bankr. 711 (M.D.
Pa. 1983); In re Russell, 29 Bankr. 270 (W.D. Okla. 1983); In re Goard, 26 Bankr. 316 (M.D.
N.C. 1982); In re Cameron, 25 Bankr. 410 (N.D. Ga. 1982); In re Wilson, 25 Bankr. 276 (D.
Neb. 1982); In re Stevens, 24 Bankr. 536 (D. Colo. 1982); In re Fickey, 23 Bankr. 586 (E.D.
Tenn. 1982); In re Georgia, 22 Bankr. 31 (S.D. Ohio 1982); In re Littlejohn, 20 Bankr. 695
(W.D. Ky. 1982); In re Mattson, 20 Bankr. 382 (W.D. Wis. 1982); In re King, 19 Bankr. 409
(M.D. Ga. 1982); In re Haus, 18 Bankr. 413 (D. S.C. 1982); In re Hobdy, 18 Bankr. 70 (W.D.
Ky. 1982); In re Kelley, 17 Bankr. 770 (E.D. Tenn. 1982); In re Rosen, 17 Bankr. 436 (D.
S.C. 1982); In re Luczak, 16 Bankr. 743 (W.D. Wis. 1982); In re Conn, 16 Bankr. 454 (W.D.
Ky. 1982); In re Ashworth, 16 Bankr. 645 (C.D. Cal. 1981); In re Gibson, 16 Bankr. 257 (D.
Kan. 1981); In re Holland, 16 Bankr. 83 (N.D. Ohio 1981); In re Lay, 15 Bankr. 841 (S.D.
Ohio 1981); In re Ward, 14 Bankr. 549 (S.D. Ga. 1981); In re Trotter, 12 Bankr. 72 (C.D.
Cal. 1981); In re Buchanan, 10 Bankr. 846 (S.D. Ohio 1981); In re Griffin, 9 Bankr. 880
(N.D. Ga. 1981); In re Booker, 9 Bankr. 710, (M.D. Ga. 1981); In re Carnes, 8 Bankr. 599
(W.D. Okla. 1982); In re Jebbia, 9 Bankr. 542 (S.D. Ala. 1980); In re Slay, 8 Bankr. 355
(E.D. Tenn. 1980); In re Coomer, 8 Bankr. 351 (E.D. Tenn. 1980); In re James, 7 Bankr. 73
(D. Me. 1980); In re Coronado, 7 Bankr. 53 (D. Ariz. 1980); In re Krulik, 6 Bankr. 443 (M.D.
Tenn. 1980); In re Jones, 5 Bankr. 655 (M.D. N.C. 1980); In re Scott, 5 Bankr. 37 (M.D. Pa.
1980), In re Mulcahy, 3 Bankr. 454 (S.D. Ind. 1980); In re Norrell, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1185 (M.D. Ga. 1977); In re Brouse, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 471 (W.D.
Mich. 1969).
60. At least one author has proposed that
[tiransformation of nonpurchase money security interests upon refinancing, which is
inherent in the Simpson rationale, does not fairly balance the interests of the parties
involved in bankruptcy proceedings. Good faith creditors lend purchase money in re-
liance that their security interests will have purchase money priority; this should not
be avoided by refinancing. If courts continue to follow the Simpson rationale and
deny creditors purchase money status, debtors will find refinancing difficult to obtain.
The interests of both creditors and debtors will be advanced if the lead taken by
Conn is followed and Simpson is ultimately rejected.
Note, Section 522(f): A Proposal For the Survival of Purchase Money Security Interests
Following Refinancing, 18 TuLSA L.J. 280, 304 (1982).
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The exemption provision allows the debtor, after bankruptcy has
been filed. . . to undo the consequences of a contract of adhesion,
signed in ignorance, by permitting the invalidation of nonpurchase
money security interests in household goods. Such security interests
have too often been used by over-reaching creditors. [Section 522]
eliminates any unfair advantage creditors have. 1
Courts have lined up on both sides of the issue, with the weight
of the authority expressing the view that a security interest by a
seller of goods6 2 that claims collateral other than the items sold is
not a purchase money security interest. If the lien does not qualify
as a purchase money interest, the debtor can avoid it under section
522(f).
The courts adopting this view adhere to the rule of In re Ma-
nuel63 that "if consumer goods serve any price other than their
own, and there is no formula for application of payments, the se-
curity interest in those goods is not purchase money."6 " In In re
Jebbia6 5 and In re Booker,6 both courts reviewed security interests
under subsection 522(f), and adopted the reasoning of In re Ma-
nuel as applied to purchase money interests under section 9-302 in
concluding that the security interests at issue were not purchase
money. 7 Similarly, in In re Mulcahy,"5 the court found no reason
to apply a different rule to security agreements executed as part of
61. Stevens v. Associates Fin. Serv., 24 Bankr. 536 (D. Colo. 1982) (quoting HR REP. No.
595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 127 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787,
6088).
62. In re Dillon, 18 Bankr. 252 (E.D. Cal. 1982) is one of the few cases that addresses the
§ 522(0 purchase money concept where goods other than consumer goods are involved. The
collateral in question in that case was a tractor. The debtor argued the tractor was a tool of
the trade under § 522(0, and that he could therefore avoid a nonpurchase money security
interest in it. The court determined that the tractor was a tool of the trade, and followed In
re Manuel, 507 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975), in ruling that the interest was not a purchase
money security interest because it included other collateral. The debtor was therefore al-
lowed to avoid the lien. Dillon, 18 Bankr. at 254-55. Although Dillon involved equipment,
rather than items traditionally recognized as consumer goods, the case really does not aid in
understanding the scope of purchase money interests since the equipment was a type of
property specifically listed in § 522(f). Congress decided that its policy of discouraging ven-
dors from overreaching applied to this type of equipment, i.e., tools of the trade, with the
same force that it applied to consumer goods. Id. at 256.
63. 507 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975).
64. In re Mulcahy, 3 Bankr. 454, 457 (S.D. Ind. 1980).
65. 9 Bankr. 542 (S.D. Ala. 1980).
66. 9 Bankr. 710 (M.D. Ga. 1981).
67. Id. at 712-13.
68. 3 Bankr. 454 (S.D. Ind. 1980).
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refinancing loans.6 9
In In re Mulcahy, the trustee attacked each security interest as
nonpurchase money under section 522(f). The secured party ad-
vanced the debtor funds to pay off his entire debt, and then took a
security interest in all property he had earlier sold the debtor to
support the debt. The court stated that "[h]ad the Mulcahys gone
to a third party lender and borrowed money to pay off Morris Plan
[the secured party], that paying off would certainly have had [the]
effect [of destroying purchase money status]. The court sees no
reasons why a different rule should apply merely because Morris
Plan transferred money from its right pocket to its left. '70 The
refinancing of the debt by the same creditor destroyed the
purchase money status in the same manner that a refinancing by a
second non-seller creditor would have.7 1
Few of the cases adopting the reasoning of In re Manuel have
considered the notion that the policies underlying definition of a
section 9-302 purchase money security interest might not apply to
subsection 522(f). The principal case that rejects the In re Manuel
rule in the context of subsection 522(f) is In re Gibson.72 In a well
developed opinion, the court reviewed all the cases on purchase
money status. The court recognized that the purchase money issue
may arise in three different contexts: (1) perfection without filing
under subsection 9-302(1)(d); (2) the bankrupt's right to avoid a
lien under subsection 522(f); and (3) the priority conflict rules of
subsections 9-312(3), (4), and (5). 7 The court then examined some
of the reasons for the special treatment accorded purchase money
security interests by each of these rules. Judge Pusateri concluded
that the policy of subsection 522(f) to limit overreaching by credi-
tors was clear but that "Congress enacted [subsection] 522(f) to
allow the consumer debtor 'to avoid security interests in their al-
ready owned, used household goods.' "74 Thus, Congress never in-
tended that a debtor could use subsection 522(f) to avoid a
purchase money lien first created by the vendor to secure a debt on
one item sold to the debtor, but which the vendor simply contin-
69. Id. at 457.
70. Id. at 456-57.
71. See also In re Haus, 18 Bankr. 413 (D.S.C. 1982). But see In re Slay, 8 Bankr. 355
(E.D. Tenn. 1980) (finding that loan consolidation did not affect purchase money status if
debtor had made no payments).
72. 16 Bankr. 257 (D. Kan. 1981).
73. Id. at 265-66.
74. Id. at 266 (quoting In re Coomer, 8 Bankr. 351, 354 (E.D. Tenn. 1980)).
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ued after the price was paid in order to secure a debt on a second
item subsequently purchased from the vendor.
Finally, relying extensively on an article by Professor Gerald
McLaughlin, the court catalogued its responses to In re Manuel
and its progeny: (1) the U.C.C. nowhere states that a purchase
money security interest is transformable; (2) the "to the extent"
language of section 9-107 authorizes a broad scope for purchase
money interest; (3) In re Manuel may be limited to the subsection
9-302(1)(d) situation and only applies to the filing exemption for a
consumer good; and (4) the transformation rule defeats the pur-
pose of the uniform priority system and discourages creditors from
advancing money to consumer debtors to acquire new assets. 5 Ac-
cordingly, the court devised a court-made first-in, first-out rule
and determined that the creditor applied the loan payment to
items first purchased. When the debtor had paid the total price on
that item, it was released as collateral under the security agree-
ment. Since no collateral secured a debt other than its outstanding
purchase price under the court-made rule, the security interest was
purchase money.70
B. Policies Underlying the Subsection 522(f) Decisions
The holdings in the subsection 522(f) cases indicate three poli-
cies the courts have recognized and sought to accommodate. The
first policy is that of preventing overreaching by creditors." The
legislative history clearly shows that Congress intended this policy
to be the primary thrust behind subsection 522(f). The law should
not allow a seller-creditor to create a security interest in all of a
debtor's existing household and personal goods in order to back up
a credit sale to the debtor.
The second policy apparent in the subsection 522(f) cases is the
notion that a seller has a right to maintain an interest in any prop-
75. Id. at 267-69 (citing McLaughlin, "Add On Clauses" in Equipment Purchase Money
Financing: Too Much of a Good Thing, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 661 (1981)).
76. Id.; see also In re Stevens, 24 Bankr. 536 (D. Colo. 1982). In In re Keller, 29 Bankr. 91
(M.D. Fla. 1983), the court found that the security agreement properly allocated the
debtor's payments so as to preserve the vendor's purchase money status. The court in In re
Mulcahy, 3 Bankr. 454 (S.D. Ind. 1980) held that the Indiana version of the U.C.C. provided
for the creditor to allocate payments on a first-in, first-out basis. However, the Mulcahy
court also found that the U.C.C. did not apply to the creditor in this situation because he
was an assignee of the original seller.
77. See Stevens v. Associates Fin. Servs., 24 Bankr. 536 (D. Colo. 1982); see also supra
note 61 and accompanying text.
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erty that he has sold the debtor. 8 Moreover, the interest remains
valid and appropriate even if the debtor has paid off the purchase
price of an item. The seller simply retains his interest in the item
to secure the price of property sold to the debtor at a later time.
The basis for this line of reasoning is that Congress intended to
limit a creditor's rights in a particular way under subsection 522(f).
Subsection 522(f) prevents a seller from taking a security interest
in the existing property of the debtor, to the extent that the se-
cured party cannot take a security interest in the debtor's property
which the seller-creditor did not sell to him. The concept of over-
reaching does not preclude a seller's continued interest in property
he earlier sold the debtor.
The third trend in the subsection 522(f) cases is the courts' will-
ingness to salvage a true purchase money interest in the debtor's
property, even when the creditor has overreached. 9 Some courts
allow the seller-creditor to retain his interest in merchandise he
sold to the debtor, when the debtor still owes on the property, even
though the security agreement claims property for which the
debtor has paid. The courts that have devised a first-in, first-out
rule, or that have looked to outside factors such as state consumer
statutes to find a first-in, first-out device, illustrate this willingness
to save a true purchase money security interest from the effect of
section 522(f). The language of U.C.C. section 9-107 provides sup-
port for this position.8
VIII. THE SECTION 9-312(3)81 PURCHASE MONEY SECURED PARTY
A. General Requirements
In terms of monetary impact, U.C.C. subsection 9-312(3)'s treat-
ment of a purchase money secured party is clearly more important
than the treatment provided for in either U.C.C. section 9-302 or
subsection 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code. Both section 9-302 and
subsection 522(f) apply to consumer goods, which are usually rela-
tively inexpensive.8 2 Subsection 9-312(3) deals with the impact of a
78. See In re Coomer, 8 Bankr. 351 (E.D. Tenn. 1980).
79. See In re Gibson, 16 Bankr. 247 (D. Kan. 1981); see also supra notes 72-76 and ac-
companying text.
80. U.C.C. § 9-107 (1978) provides that a "security interest is a 'purchase money security
interest' to the extent that it is (a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure
all or a part of its price." (emphasis added).
81. Id. § 9-312(3).
82. U.C.C. § 9-109 (1) (1978) defines "consumer goods" as those used or bought for use
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purchase money security interest on inventory collateral." This
type of collateral secures billions of dollars of debt.
Under subsection 9-312(3), a purchase money secured party who
gives notice to a prior secured party, and who perfects by the time
the debtor receives the property, will defeat the earlier secured
party's interest in purchased property. Although the notice and
perfection requirements of the section may raise some technical
questions, the significant issue is who qualifies as a subsection 9-
312(3) purchase money secured party.84 The only case that directly
discusses this issue is Southtrust Bank v. Borg-Warner Accept-
ance Corp.85
B. The Southtrust Bank Case
As explained earlier in the article,8 Southtrust Bank perfected a
security interest in all of the debtor's existing and after-acquired
property. Subsequent to the Bank's perfection, Borg-Warner Ac-
ceptance Corporation sold property to the debtor over an extended
period and retained a security interest in the property sold. Borg-
Warner claimed to have a purchase money security interest. The
questionable feature of Borg-Warner's security interest was the af-
ter-acquired property clause in the security agreement. Under this
clause, Borg-Warner sought to secure its loan with the property
which created the indebtedness and with property the debtor later
purchased. Southtrust Bank argued that this scheme entirely de-
stroyed any purchase money character of Borg-Warner's security
interest.87 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit agreed with the bank.8
The court first ruled that prior cases regarding the perfection of
primarily for personal, family or household purposes.
83. U.C.C. § 9-109(4) (1978) provides that
goods are . . . 'inventory' if they are held by a person who holds them for sale or
lease or to be furnished under contracts of service or if he has so furnished them, or if
they are raw materials, work in process or materials used or consumed in a business.
Inventory of a person is not to be classified as his equipment.
84. A principal issue in Southtrust Bank v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 760 F.2d 1240
(11th Cir. 1985), not discussed in this article, was whether Borg-Warner had given South-
trust notice of its proposed purchase money security interest. Some of the notice problems
of a § 9-312(3) priority are presented in 2 R. ALDERMAN & R. DOLE, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE
TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1070-73 (2d ed. 1983).
85. 760 F.2d 1240 (11th Cir. 1985).
86. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
87. 760 F.2d at 1242.
88. Id.
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purchase money status under section 9-302 were applicable with
respect to the priority rule of subsection 9-312(3)."e Thus, the
court relied on In re Manuel for the proposition that a purchase
money interest must be limited to the item purchased at the time
of the agreement and cannot exceed the price of that item.90 The
court specifically stated that the type of collateral claimed by the
secured party had no place in defining a purchase money secured
party; whether the purchase money secured party is a vendor of
inventory, or of consumer goods, his security agreement must meet
the same test.91 Next, Borg-Warner raised the point that a simple
boiler plate after-acquired property clause, which the creditor has
not exercised (in that he has not claimed collateral under the
clause), should not affect purchase money status. The court never
reached this interesting issue since it ruled that Borg-Warner did
claim collateral under its after-acquired property clause.92
The court was content to rely upon cases that defined purchase
money security status under the perfection rule of section 9-302,
and through those cases to rely upon the support of the subsection
89. Id.
90. Id. (citing In re Manuel, 507 F.2d 990, 993 (5th Cir. 1975)).
91. Id. at 1243.
92. Id. The court did not rule on the question of whether an after-acquired property
clause in a purchase money security agreement destroys the purchase money nature of the
security interest where the secured party makes no claim to the after-acquired property.
This type of case is unlikely to occur since it is very difficult to determine if a purchase
money secured party is exercising an after-acquired property clause until after default. Fur-
ther, it is unlikely that a secured party will draft an after-acquired property clause into his
secured agreement and then assert he has never claimed any interest in that collateral.
Mere inclusion of the clause in the agreement is grounds for the earlier Article Nine se-
cured party to assert that the purchase money secured party has exercised the broad after-
acquired property provision. On the other hand, in cases like In re Gibson, 16 Bankr. 257
(D. Kan. 1981), the court has been willing to find a portion of a security interest to be
purchase money. Therefore, if a suitable case of an unexercised after-acquired property
clause reached a court, the purchase money secured party might save part of his interest.
Mid-Atlantic Flange Co. v. Alper, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 203, 208 (E.D. Pa.
1979) supports the proposition, the court stating that "we think that the Fifth Circuit might
well agree that Manuel [sic] should be confined to those situations where non-purchase
money debts are actually incurred." However the court noted as follows:
Since there were ... no sales previous to the signing of the security agreement,
and no extensions of credit from [the secured party] to the bankrupt other than as
part of a conditional sale, [the court left] for another day the question of whether
such extensions of credit would totally prohibit the characterization of the security
agreement as a purchase money security agreement, or whether they would merely
limit the purchase money character of the security interest to that portion of the debt
secured which is taken or retained to secure the purchase price of the collateral.
Id. at 209.
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522(f) bankruptcy decisions. 93 The court failed to study the rea-
sons and purposes of the subsection 9-312(3) rule to determine if
the policies underlying the section 9-302 and subsection 522(f)
cases justified reliance on them for purposes of identifying a sub-
section 9-312(3) purchase money party.9 4
C. The Purpose of the Section 9-312(3) Exception
The well-documented policy underlying the subsection 9-312(3)
and (4) exceptions is based on the idea of protecting the debtor
from a secured party with an interest in the debtor's after-acquired
property.9 5 If the U.C.C. did not provide for the purchase money
exception, an inventory supplier of the debtor would be reluctant
to sell to the debtor on credit. Any goods the supplier sold the
debtor would be subject to the security interest of the prior after-
acquired property lender, and thus the supplier would have only a
second priority security interest in the very goods he sold the
debtor. The drafters intended the subsection 9-312(3) exception to
enable the debtor to purchase from the supplier on credit, and not
be under the control of the financier's decisions regarding further
extensions of credit. The after-acquired property financier does not
have first priority in all the debtor's collateral; the purchase money
secured party can create a security interest that is superior to all
earlier Article Nine interests.
93. The court stated that it saw "no policy reasons for creating a distinction [in consumer
and commercial transactions] where the drafters [had] not done so." Southtrust Bank v.
Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 760 F.2d 1240, 1242 (11th Cir. 1985).
94. In Raleigh Indus., Inc. v. Tassone, 74 Cal. App. 3d 692, 141 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1977), the
court interpreted a non-uniform state version of U.C.C. § 9-102. The California statute pro-
vided that
[n]o nonpossessory security interest, other than a purchase money security interest,
may be given or taken in or to the inventory of a retail merchant held for sale, except
in or to inventory consisting of durable goods having a unit retail value of at least five
hundred dollars. . . . The phrase "purchase money security interest" as used in this
subdivision does not extend to any after-acquired property other than the initial
property sold by a secured party or taken by a lender as security as provided in Sec-
tion 9107.
Id. at 700, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 646 (quoting CAL. COM. CODE § 9102(4) (West 1964) (currently
located as amended in Cum. Supp. 1986)). The court held that under this provision a
purchase money lender could not claim a security interest in after-acquired property. The
interesting point in the case is that the court did not discuss the effect of the after-acquired
property claim on the true purchase money collateral. The purchase money security interest
is unaffected by the after-acquired property claim under this provision of the California
Commercial Code.
95. B. CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 3.9(1) (1980).
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If the purpose of the subsection 9-312(3) purchase money excep-
tion is to allow the debtor to bargain effectively for future exten-
sion of credit in order to maintain his inventory, the next issue
involves the scope of the exception required in order to achieve
this policy. The U.C.C. drafters have provided some direction re-
garding the scope of the exception in subsection 9-312(3) itself."
First, the drafters limited the exception to those purchase money
parties that fulfill the subsection's conditions. These conditions are
that the purchase money secured party must give notice,97 and be
perfected, at the time the debtor received possession of the inven-
tory. Second, the drafters limited the collateral that the purchase
money could claim. The exception basically applies only to original
collateral, and not to the proceeds of the collateral.
The notice requirement benefits the earlier secured party with
an after-acquired property clause. It makes him aware that he can-
not extend future advances in reliance on the debtor's recently
purchased inventory. The notice should be a warning that he may
have a second priority security interest in some of the debtor's
collateral.98
D. The Limitation on Proceeds
In the 1972 amendments to Article Nine, the Permanent Edito-
rial Board of the U.C.C. settled the dispute that had arisen over
the purchase money party's claim for priority in proceeds of inven-
tory. Normally, a secured party's perfected interest carries over
into the proceeds of the collateral.9 Moreover, this continued se-
curity interest in proceeds will usually remain perfected.100 Since
proceeds of inventory in most instances are accounts that are cre-
ated when the debtor sells his inventory, the conflicting claim to
96. It was proposed at one time that U.C.C. § 9-107 provide for a purchase-money inter-
est to the extent of value advanced for the purpose of financing new acquisitions within 10
days of the debtor's receiving possession of the new goods even though the value was not in
fact used to pay the price. The paragraph was deleted, according to the sponsors, because it
extended the purchase-money interest too far. 2 G. GiMoRE, supra note 14, § 29.2, at 782
n.6.
97. The notice requirement of § 9-312(3) may itself cause problems for the purchase
money secured party. Section 9-312(3) is subject to conflicting interpretations as to when
and where notice must be given. Baker, The Ambiguous Notilication Requirement of Re-
vised U.C.C. Section 9-312(3): Inventory Financers Beware!, 98 BANKING L.J. 4 (1981).
98. U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 4 (1978).
99. Id. § 9-306(2).
100. Id. § 9-306(3).
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those proceeds comes from an account financier with an after-ac-
quired property clause. 101 The 1972 amendment gives the secured
party with an after-acquired property clause in his security agree-
ment priority in the proceeds, i.e., accounts, over a purchase
money secured party whose original collateral was inventory. 02
The drafters believed that the implementation of subsection 9-
312(3) warranted affording a purchase money party less protection
than the U.C.C. normally affords a secured party. A debtor can
still bargain effectively for credit with a vendor, even when the
vendor knows that he can only achieve a first priority position in
the original collateral, and recognizes that this interest in proceeds
is subordinated to an earlier Article Nine secured party claiming
an interest in the collateral.
E. The Type of Collateral Affects the Nature of the Purchase
Money Interest
The background of subsection 9-312(3) lends strong support to
the idea that the scope of a purchase money secured party's inter-
est can vary depending upon the results the drafters intended to
achieve. It is conceivable that a party can have purchase money
status under one section of the U.C.C. and in other circumstances
101. One author has observed:
Because Section 9-306 provides for a perfected security interest to continue in identi-
fiable proceeds, there has been considerable discussion about whether the purchase
money inventory financer's priority continued in accounts arising when inventory was
sold so as to take priority over an earlier accounts financer. This issue is resolved in
Revised Section 9-312(3) by giving the purchase money security interest priority over
conflicting security interests in the same collateral and "in identifiable cash proceeds
received on or before delivery of the inventory to a buyer" provided the required
steps are taken. Since the cash must be received before the debtor gets the goods, the
cash cannot be proceeds of an account, and since the cash must be identifiable, the
priority is probably restricted to checks, unless the secured party is extremely agile
and assiduously polices the debtor's conduct of his business.
R. HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 137-38 (2d ed.
1979).
102. As the U.C.C. explains:
One of the most widely discussed questions under the 1962 Code was the question of
the priority between a person claiming accounts as proceeds of inventory and a per-
son claiming the accounts by direct filing with respect thereto. One issue was whether
the special position of an inventory financer as a purchase money financer or as the
first financer in the business cycle of the debtor gave him any special position as to
accounts resulting from the inventory. In general, as revised, a negative answer has
been given, and a prior right to inventory does not confer a prior right to any pro-
ceeds except identifiable cash proceeds received on or before the delivery of the
inventory.
U.C.C. § 9-312 comment (1978) (reasons for 1972 change to (2)(c)).
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not enjoy the same status under another section. However, the no-
tion expressed in Southtrust Bank, that a purchase money secured
party's status does not hinge to some degree on the class of collat-
eral involved, is questionable.10 3
Section 9-312 itself treats purchase money security interests dif-
ferently, depending on the collateral involved. The U.C.C. singles
out inventory for special treatment in subsection 9-312(3) and
lumps all other types of collateral under subsection 9-312(4). The
purchase money secured interest in inventory does not extend to
proceeds. However, a purchase money interest under subsection 9-
312(4), which will usually be an interest in equipment, does extend
to proceeds. The Southtrust Bank court relied on section 9-302
cases that involved consumer goods in defining a subsection 9-
312(3) purchase money security interest in inventory. The counsel-
ing point is that to simply conclude that all purchase money inter-
ests are identical, for all types of collateral, does not take the anal-
ysis far enough. The Southtrust Bank court should have studied
the reason for the rule.
F. The Commercial Effectiveness of Subsection 9-312(3)
I
The paucity of cases in this area may indicate that very few
lenders ever truly rely upon their purchase money status for prior-
ity. Most major inventory financiers probably have priority be-
cause they are first to perfect. If these lenders have an on-going
relationship with the debtor, such as in the case of the automobile
manufacturer and his dealer, the parties entered into the security
agreement when the debtor commenced business. In other cases,
where the debtor changes from one brand of inventory to another,
or where the debtor has a large outstanding operating loan at the
time the debtor starts purchasing inventory, the inventory finan-
cier will obtain a subordination agreement from the prior secured
party. The earlier secured party is willing to subordinate his inter-
est in many situations so that the debtor can continue in business
and the earlier secured party will not have to advance further
103. The Southtrust Bank court stated that "[niothing in the language of U.C.C. § 9-
312(3) or § 9-107 distinguishes between consumer and commercial transactions or between
bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy contexts." 760 F.2d at 1242. The court therefore saw "no
policy reasons for creating a distinction where the drafters have not done so." Id.
The court in Mid-Atlantic Flange Co. v. Alper, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. [Callaghan) 203 (E.D.
Pa. 1979), takes a different view, stating that "different conditions apply" to commercial, as
opposed to consumer, transactions. Id. at 208.
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money to the debtor. Through this method the debtor acquires
money from another source, and the infusion of cash allows him to
continue making payments to both secured creditors. The South-
trust Bank fact situation may actually be an abnormality since the
second creditor relied upon the subsection 9-312(3) exception for
priority.10 4 The security agreement that Borg-Warner used in the
case is a standard agreement with a standard after-acquired prop-
erty clause. Borg-Warner probably did not originally draft the se-
curity agreement to cover the purchase money situation.
G. The Present Status of the Subsection 9-312(3) Exception
In light of the limitations that the drafters placed on the subsec-
tion 9-312(3) exception and the commercial realities of inventory
financing, the court in Southtrust Bank reached the proper result
in limiting the scope of the subsection 9-312(3) purchase money
security interest. The court reached this result even though it
failed to properly develop a firm foundation for, and relied too
heavily on section 9-302 cases in reaching, its decision. 10 5 The court
should have explored the reason for the subsection 9-312(3) excep-
tion and the drafters' intention regarding its operation, in addition
to the section 9-302 and subsection 522(f) cases it did address.
To qualify as a purchase money secured party under subsection
9-312(3), the creditor must limit his security interest to the item
purchased at the time of the agreement, and the debt cannot ex-
ceed the price of that item. This result respects the sanctity of the
single priority rule of the U.C.C., which is based on precedence in
time of filing or perfection.
The narrow reading of purchase money security interest in-
tended by the U.C.C. drafters0 6 also gives the debtor some bar-
gaining power without destroying the earlier security interest. In-
ventory moves quickly; the debtor is selling items and replacing
them continuously. If the purchase money secured party were to be
given superior priority in property he sold the debtor and in the
debtor's after-acquired property, then the earlier secured party
soon would completely lose his place on the priority ladder and be
totally subordinated to the purchase money lender.
104. Southtrust Bank v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 760 F.2d 1240, 1242, reh'g de-
nied mem., 774 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1985).
105. Id. at 1242-43; see also supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
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Under the Southtrust Bank rule, the debtor can obtain inven-
tory from sources other than an existing secured creditor even
though the rule restricts the purchase money secured party's abil-
ity to prime the earlier perfected interest. An occasional purchase
of inventory on credit is within the Southtrust Bank rule, and this
type of interest is small enough that the secured party can prove it.
The main requirement of the rule is that the debtor maintain a
complete accounting record, so that the "purchase-price" debt is
always matched to the collateral that gave rise to the debt.107
Moreover, the debtor should extinguish the outstanding debt on
any inventory sold. Of course, the purchase money secured party
bears the risk that the records are not thorough enough.108
IX. CONCLUSION
The courts should give the subsection 9-312(3) purchase money
security interest a narrow scope. The limitations that the subsec-
tion places on proceeds, and the fact that it distinguishes inventory
from other collateral, demonstrate that the drafters' purpose in
creating the subsection 9-312(3) exception can best be achieved
through a more limited application.
The practical application of the rule that a purchase money se-
107. Jackson and Kronman observe:
The most compelling argument is that the strict tracing requirement of § 9-
107(b)-which is the root of this difference in treatment-is itself desirable. First,
this tracing requirement helps to distinguish the true purchase money lender from
the ordinary lender with "hindsight wisdom" or fraudulent intent. Second, it protects
other creditors by compelling the purchase money lender to keep a close watch over
his debtor's affairs. The fact that a financing buyer generally will be unable to satisfy
a strict tracing requirement is therefore reason enough to deny him priority over pre-
viously perfected security interests in the same collateral.
Jackson & Kronman, A Plea for the Financing Buyer, 85 YALE L.J. 1, 32 (1975) (footnotes
omitted).
108. The purchase money secured party must prove his claim to purchase money status.
In the case of Ever Ready Machinists, Inc. v. Relpack Corp., 25 Bankr. 148 (E.D.N.Y. 1982),
the court stated:
The policy expressed in the Uniform Commercial Code is to give priority to the se-
cured creditor first in time. In this case, Gibraltar is clearly first in time; its financial
[sic] statements were filed long prior to those filed by Ever Ready. Ever Ready can
only prevail if it brings itself within the exception carved out for purchase money
security interests under certain conditions. It is a long-established rule of statutory
construction that the person claiming the benefit of an exception must show himself
to be covered by it. If the record is blank-as the record now is-regarding whether a
critical requirement of § 9-312(4) has been satisfied, the exception is not proved and
the general rule prevails.
Id. at 152-53.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
cured party must limit his interest to property sold to the debtor,
and that there must be a strict matching of debt to property sold,
limits the value of the purchase money secured interest and the
after-acquired property clause in the earlier security interest. First,
the purchase money secured interest can only have first priority in
a limited amount of collateral, i.e. collateral on which an indebted-
ness is outstanding. If, in any provision of his security agreement,
the secured party claims an interest in property other than the ex-
act property that is the subject of the debt, he totally destroys his
purchase money security interest. Second, if in his security agree-
ment the secured party provides for an interest in property other
than that which produced the debt, and yet does not make claim
to the other collateral, he may still lose his special purchase money
status. This is so because of the presence of the unexercised after-
acquired property clause, and in view of the uncertainty of the law
on this point. The courts have not responded adequately to the
effect of an unexercised after-acquired property provision. 109
The result is that a purchase money secured party must care-
fully draft his security agreement and keep precise records that
match collateral to its debt. The business costs and the risks of
accounting errors render the subsection 9-312(3) purchase money
exception largely valueless, except in the case of the occasional
credit sale of a limited number of inventory items. A secured party
such as Borg-Warner, who supplies inventory to a debtor over an
extended period of time, can never rely safely on subsection 9-
312(3) for first priority status. The cost of records matching collat-
eral to debt exceeds normal bookkeeping costs, and the risks that
these records will not be accurate, current, or complete are insur-
mountable. A major inventory financier can only deal with a
debtor who is subject to an earlier perfected security interest with
an after-acquired property clause if he first obtains a subordina-
tion agreement from the earlier secured party.
Once the purchase party has given notice of his claim to an ear-
lier secured party, the notice is in effect for five years. Thus, any
prior secured party is operating in the dark after receipt of the
notice. He does not know the exact items of inventory in which the
purchase money secured party asserts his superior priority, nor
does he know in which items of inventory the purchase money se-
109. Mid-Atlantic Flange Co. v. Alper, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 203 (E.D. Pa.
1979) is the only case to discuss this issue. See supra note 92.
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cured party can prove his claim of purchase money status. Even
the debtor probably does not have this information. The only
source of record-keeping information is the purchase money se-
cured party himself, and he is a rather unreliable one since at the
time of default he will be an adversary.
The purchase money secured party bears the risk that he cannot
match collateral to debt and prove his purchase money priority.
However, the after-acquired property secured party bears the risk
that the purchase money party can match collateral to debt and
meet his burden of proof. Both of these risks are substantial. In
light of the sketchy information available to the earlier secured
party, any loans after the creation and perfection of the purchase
money security interest are in danger of being under-collateralized,
or subordinated in priority to a subsequent loan. On the other
hand, a major inventory financier cannot afford to rely on a
purchase money claim for priority because of the limited scope of
subsection 9-312(3), the cost of the accounting, and the potential
inability to trace funds and debt to collateral.
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